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Abstract 
Using an original dataset from the Vietnamese catfish sector, we study the impact of 
vertical coordination options on household welfare and the implications of different 
stages of vertical coordination for the success of the whole sector. The welfare gain from 
contract farming and employment on processor-owned estate farms is estimated using a 
maximum simulated likelihood estimator. Our results show positive welfare effects from 
participating in contract farming, but not from employment on processor-owned estate 
farms. The results imply that contract farming presents opportunities for economic 
growth, but additional effort is required to make the contracts more accessible to 
smallholders.  
 
Key words: vertical coordination, catfish, maximum simulated likelihood, agri-food 
transformation, Vietnam 
 
JEL codes: D02, D31, O17, L14, L24  
1. Introduction  
Farmers from developing countries are connected to consumers in global markets through 
a series of arrangements that range from spot market transactions over contracts to full 
vertical integration of ownership of all transaction stages. The effects of these different 
arrangements – or modes of vertical coordination – on the participants of the modern 
agro-food sector are highly debated. While one group of studies points to severe 
consequences of the exclusion of smallholders from global markets (Reardon, Barrett, 
Berdegué, & Swinnen, 2009) and raising income inequality with the proliferation of 
contract farming schemes (Little & Watts, 1994), another group of studies argues that 
rural areas can benefit from participation in global trade because of (i) positive effects of 
participation in export on farmers’ productivity (Minten, Randrianarison, & Swinnen, 
2009), (ii) employment opportunities (Maertens & Swinnen, 2009) and (iii) access to 
technology, inputs and investment (Gow & Swinnen, 1998). Many of these benefits are, 
however, available mainly to vertically integrated farms (Dries & Swinnen, 2004).  
 
Taking the case of striped catfish1 farmers in Vietnam, this paper investigates welfare 
effects of different vertical coordination options, namely contract farming and full 
vertical integration of catfish farms by processing companies. Catfish is a farmed 
freshwater fish that is marketed under several other names: pangasius, swai, basa, river 
cobbler or iridescent shark. The catfish export chain is a relevant case for a study of 
vertical coordination outcomes for several reasons. With substantial markets in more than 
100 countries worldwide, total production of over 1 million metric tons and an export 
turnover of more than USD 1 billion, the Vietnamese catfish has become a major global 
industry over the past decade (Phuong & Oanh, 2010). The increase in export volumes 
was followed by changes in sector organisation and governance structure. Bosma et al. 
(2011) report a growing trend for vertical integration of farms by processing companies 
in the sector. It is not known how these changes affect participants, as the sector has 
scarcely been studied until recently, when several studies investigated the broader 
political-economic setting in which the industry has developed (Belton, Little, & Sinh, 
2011; Loc, Bush, Sinh, & Khiem, 2010).  
1. Termed catfish in the rest of the paper. 
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 In this paper we assess the welfare effects of different vertical coordination options in the 
catfish sector. In particular, we compare the outcomes from farming catfish as either non-
integrated, contract or estate farmer. We aim to answer several questions: Who benefits 
from vertical coordination in the sector? What is the best governance option for the 
average farmer? What is the best governance option for the whole sector? Understanding 
the incentives and outcomes of participation in different institutional arrangements may 
lead to better arrangements for production of high-value export commodities and 
improved smallholder welfare in developing countries.  
 
The analysis is based on an original dataset from the Vietnamese catfish sector and 
qualitative interviews with key actors from the sector. We aim to contribute in three ways 
to the literature on the consequences of transformation of agri-food sectors, where 
contract farming and vertical integration are recurrent themes.  
 
First, we simultaneously compare the effect of two vertical coordination forms on 
farmers’ welfare. The impact of contract farming on smallholders’ livelihoods has 
received sizeable attention (see Bellemare, 2012; Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009; Warning & 
Key, 2002), but only Maertens and Swinnen (2009) compare the effect of contract 
farming and employment on industrial farms with non-participation. They estimate the 
effects of contract farming and employment, respectively, using propensity score 
matching, thereby assuming that conditioning on observable variables is sufficient for 
determining the causal effect of vertical coordination on household welfare. As 
processing companies may choose employees on the estate farms and contract farmers 
based on unobservable characteristics, such as effort or managerial abilities, we use an 
instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we estimate the impact of contract farming 
and estate employment using the maximum simulated likelihood estimator developed by 
Deb and Trivedi (2006). Second, unlike studies that compare producers in the export 
sector with producers that exclusively sell in the domestic market (for example, Maertens 
& Swinnen, 2009), we estimate the welfare outcomes for three groups of farmers that all 
participate in the catfish export sector based on the chosen governance structure. Third, 
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we use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to understand and explain 
individual and contextual drivers of vertical coordination, and to elicit the functional 
relationship between farmers’ welfare and vertical coordination.  
 
Our results show that the gain from participating in intensive export sectors depends on 
the governance structure. Although belonging to a high-value export sector is not 
conditioned by contracts, we find that producing under contract has a positive effect on 
consumption expenditure when evaluated against the situation of non-integrated farmers. 
Conversely, we find no difference in welfare between estate farm employees and non-
integrated farms. Thus, our results imply that traditionally vulnerable groups – such as 
landless wage labourers who work on estate farms – are not left behind in the process of 
rapid transformation of rural economies with the arrival of high-value export sectors 
because they can look for employment on estate farms and thereby achieve the same level 
of wellbeing as the non-integrated farmers. 
 
2. Overview of the Catfish Sector 
Vietnam has been the home of intensive aquaculture production since the 1990s – a 
period of high investments in production of several exportable species of shrimp and 
white fish. The catfish sector developed in rural areas of the Mekong River Delta (MRD) 
from subsistence farms that grew catfish for personal consumption. Catfish was sold in 
local markets until the early 2000s, when pond cultivation became intensified to 
accommodate the growing interest in export.  
 
The current catfish farming area is around 6,000 hectares (Dzung, 2011). In 2010, 
farmers produced 1.35 million metric tons of catfish and exported 660,000 metric tons of 
frozen catfish fillets bringing the USD 1.43 billion of export revenue (Dzung, 2011). 
Catfish is currently the second most exported commodity in terms of volume, after rice.  
 
The sector is based on intensively farmed holdings (Phan et al., 2009). Accompanying the 
development of intensive farms was a growth in the number of hatcheries, nurseries and 
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processing companies. Processing companies are involved in primary production through 
contracts or direct farm ownership and management.  
 
The development of the sector has not been without disturbances. Vietnam faced trade 
disputes with the USA in 2002-2004 over the use of the name catfish, which in the USA 
remained reserved for the local channel catfish (Cuyvers & Binh, 2008). As a result, the 
share of catfish exported to USA decreased from 80 to 4 per cent (WWF, 2010). In 2010, 
catfish appeared on WWF’s Red List that advises consumers against buying 
unsustainable products. Soon after, it fronted negative publicity in European media for 
being unsafe for consumption due to intensive use of antibiotics in production and 
negative environmental impact (Bush & Duijf, 2011).  
 
Concurrent with the global financial crisis, demand fluctuations and price volatility 
caused financial losses to 50 per cent of catfish farmers (Sinh & Hien, 2010). These 
changes affected small-scale farmers, who switched to producing less capital-intensive 
aquaculture species or agricultural commodities, leasing their ponds and becoming 
employed by processing companies. Overall, between 30 and 50 per cent of farmers 
stopped producing catfish since 2009 when the number of farmers was around 4,000 
(SFP, 2011; Vietnamnews, 2011).  
 
All of these events, to which catfish producers and processors needed to adapt, influence 
the structure of the sector. The loss of the American market called for new product 
outlets. At first, the surplus went to the EU countries, but with the strict food regulation 
for imported products, the market absorbed only the highest quality products. The so-
called second grade products are sold at a lower price in Eastern Europe, Middle East and 
Latin America.  
 
3. Study area and data 
The analysis is based on the data obtained through qualitative interviews, farmer survey, 
field observations and published material. The data collection took place from April to 
June 2011 in three provinces in the MRD: Can Tho, Dong Thap and An Giang that 
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produce 70 per cent of total catfish output in Vietnam (VASEP, 2012). Qualitative 
interviews included 52 interviewees with specialised knowledge about the sector (see the 
Appendix).  
 
The targeted population for the survey was that of operators on catfish farms. The survey 
comprised 276 catfish farmers. Data collection relied on the assistance of the commune 
staff and the employees in the local offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development who would lead enumerators to the survey location. The average non-
response rate is estimated to be around 25 per cent at the end of the survey. 
 
The questions in the questionnaire referred to respondents’ situation in 2010. Apart from 
basic household and demographic information, the survey data contains information on 
asset ownership, marketing choices, infrastructure, expenditure and consumption. The 
consumption expenditure module was aligned to the Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Survey (GSO, 2011), which is a Living Standard Measurement Surveys questionnaire 
type used for assessing poverty and wellbeing in Vietnam. 
4. Analytical Framework 
4.1. Theoretical Background  
 
A multitude of institutional arrangements can be found in modern value chains, where 
incentives of firms to vertically integrate primary production, to contract out or to rely on 
spot markets arise as a response to market imperfections (Williamson, 1975). Vertical 
coordination is an umbrella term used for describing institutional arrangements 
occupying a range between spot market exchange and full ownership management. 
Various forms of coordination exist between these two extremes, but production contracts 
are the most relevant in the agri-food sector in developing countries (Reardon et al., 
2009). Marketing contracts and resource providing contracts are the two most common 
types. Marketing contracts are agreements between a contractor and a supplier that 
specify some form of a price and outlet ex ante, while resource providing contracts (also 
called outgrower) include farm assistance, such as extension and management services, 
inputs or credit supplied by the contractor (Swinnen & Maertens, 2007). While spot 
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markets assume coordination of activities in the value chain through price, full vertical 
integration assumes ownership of adjacent stages of a value chain into one firm. 
Especially in the case of developing countries in recent years, there has been a move from 
spot market transactions toward increasing vertical coordination, where the level of 
coordination differs between different stages in the value chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, & 
Sturgeon, 2005). These trends towards higher degree of coordination are induced by 
market failures such as asymmetric information, failures in markets for credit, insurance, 
inputs or services (Key & Runsten, 1999). 
 
Recent research has investigated how various market imperfections and transaction costs 
determine organisational structure in a particular sector. After controlling for household 
characteristics, it was found that farmers who participate in the export sector under 
different institutional arrangements (contracts or employment) enjoy positive income 
effects of participation (Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Rao & 
Qaim, 2011). Thus, in addition to increasing farmers’ welfare, vertical coordination 
arrangements may also carry over positive spill-over effects to the local economy in 
terms of employment, infrastructure and market development. An adjacent line of 
research has focused on farm characteristics that favour vertical coordination. In 
particular, farmers selling to supermarkets dispose higher land and capital endowments, 
and their production is more specialised (Neven, Odera, Reardon, & Wang, 2009). 
Whereas firm’s choice of governance structure (vertical integration, contract or spot 
market) depends on terms and conditions it is able to negotiate with farmers, these 
conditions also determine characteristics of farmers who accept the contract2 (Key & 
Runsten, 1999). 
 
4.2. Estimation Strategy  
We wish to estimate the (causal) impact of vertical coordination, Ii, on household 
welfare, Yi, recognising that the vertical coordination outcome is not independent of 
household’s socio-economic status and other characteristics. We start by identifying 
farmer characteristics that result in different vertical coordination options. The observed 
2. More details are available in the Appendix. 
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alternatives are non-integration (j = 0), vertical integration, that is, estate farming (j = 1) 
and contract farming (j = 2). Non-integrated farmers sell on the spot market. Estate 
farmers are employees on processor-owned farms, which are considered fully vertically 
integrated as a company’s share in ownership exceeds 50 per cent. Estate farms initially 
emerged as a processors’ response to weak quality assurance capabilities of farmers, but 
after the crisis in 2009, the key incentive for the integration became reducing uncertainty 
through stable fish supply. Contract farmers have either outgrower or marketing contracts 
with some of the processing companies. The outgrower contracts imply that a processing 
company supplies inputs (such as fry, fingerlings, feed and medicines) to the farmer, 
while the farmer delivers specified quantity of the fish of exportable quality. The 
production process follows the prescribed hygiene rules and ensures low mortality rates 
of fry and fingerlings. Marketing contract only stipulates quantities and price, with the 
price being conditioned on the quality test performed right before the purchase. This 
contract type is found in 83 per cent of contract farms in our sample. The weak contract 
enforcement makes the ties between processors and farmers much more flexible in case 
of marketing contracts than in the case of outgrower schemes.  
 
Table A1 in the Appendix gives the basic descriptive statistics of our sample that 
comprises 85 estate, 88 contract and 103 non-integrated farmers. These farm categories 
are mutually exclusive, that is, a farmer can belong to only one of three groups, because 
the decision to contract with a processing company or to work on estate farms reflects a 
commitment that is not partial. Unlike in high-value export sectors in other countries 
where farmers allocate only part of their land and labour to export activities while 
continuing to be independent smallholders (see Maertens & Swinnen, 2009), the catfish 
farmers dedicate all of the production area to contract farming or become full-time 
employees on estate farms.  
 
The selection of the vertical coordination form and the resulting outcomes for the farmers 
are driven by transaction costs, perceptions of the alternatives and, in the context of weak 
contract-enforcing environment, by trustworthiness, reliability or reputation. These are 
typically unobserved by the researcher, while processors are more likely to possess such 
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information, or some specific indicator of it. To achieve an unbiased estimate, we use the 
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator proposed by Deb and Trivedi (2006).  
 
We compare the outcome for contract and estate farms with the outcome for non-
integrated farmers, which we believe, constitute a good comparison group. As almost 
total catfish production is exported, all three groups of farmers sell in the same marketing 
channel but under different conditions. In this way, we obviate the problem of 
confounding the effect of vertical coordination with the effect of participation in two 
different marketing channels: selling in domestic market or for export. 
 
We estimate the following model: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝜷𝒙𝑖 + 𝜌1𝐼𝑖1 + 𝜌2𝐼𝑖2 + 𝜆0𝑡𝑖0 + 𝜆1𝑡𝑖1 + 𝜆2𝑡𝑖2 + 𝜀𝑖,   (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the per capita consumption expenditure for household i in the year 2010, 𝒙𝒊  
are the observed farm characteristics and the coefficients 𝜌1 and 𝜌2  are the average 
effects of vertical coordination on per capita consumption. As the decision about vertical 
coordination is made with future welfare in mind, the decision to integrate is not 
exogenous. Assuming 𝐼1 and 𝐼2 are exogenous would result in inconsistent estimates of 
𝜌1 and 𝜌2. In equation (1), we denote the unobserved characteristics that influence both 
the coordination decision and welfare as 𝑡𝑖𝑗 and coefficients associated with unobservable 
characteristics as 𝜆𝑗 . Thus, conditional on both the observables in xi and the 
unobservables in 𝑡𝑖𝑗, the estimated partial effect of integration can be considered as the 
causal effect. The independently distributed random error is denoted as 𝜀𝑖. 
 
We use the consumption expenditure as the dependent variable because it is ‘a more 
useful and accurate measure of living standards than … income’ (Deaton and Grosh, 
(2000, p. 94). Consumption expresses the welfare in terms of resources and prices; it 
reflects the longer-term living standard, surpassing the problem of seasonal changes in 
income or poverty status and respondents may be more reluctant to truthfully share 
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information on income (Chen & Ravallion, 2010; Deaton & Grosh, 2000). Consumption 
expenditure is also preferred because the welfare effect measured in terms of income may 
be imprecise as different types of costs are faced by three groups of farmers, especially in 
terms of loan interest rates and investment. For example, processing companies are the 
ones investing in estate farms, not the farmers who work on these farms. Comparing the 
income levels would in this setup overestimate the welfare effect of estate farming. 
 
We use the yearly per capita consumption expenditure created from recall information 
about respondents’ daily expenditures on food, drinking and smoking, monthly expenses 
for water, electricity and telephone and yearly expenditure on clothing, education, 
healthcare, transport, house rent, transfer payments and festivities. The questionnaire 
contained enough space for naming other relevant expenses in case that the list of specific 
items was not comprehensive enough. All expenses apart from production inputs were 
added so they can represent an indicator of the living standard over the year (Ravallion & 
Chen, 2005). Further, per capita consumption expenditure was calculated using the 
OECD adult equivalence scales (OECD, 2009).  
 
The controls, 𝒙𝒊 include a range of household and farm characteristics, as well as the 
variables for proximity to markets and services, which are described in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Individual farmer and household characteristics (for example age, education, 
household size and composition) and ownership of assets (production and household 
assets) may affect the probability of vertical coordination. In the context of this study, it 
is expected that younger and better-educated farmers have greater chances of benefiting 
from contracts and employment on the estate farms, as found in previous studies (Barrett 
et al., 2012). While the experience with fish farming may be important for contracts, it is 
not crucial for the employment on the estate farms where processors look for specialised 
skills and higher education. Household characteristics, such as household size and 
composition are important determinants of the effects of vertical coordination. They 
measure the household labour endowment so the expected relationship with consumption 
is positive. The relationship can, however, be negative depending on the structure of 
expenditures (Deaton & Grosh, 1998).  
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 Farm resource endowments are potentially positively related with consumption 
expenditure and vertical coordination. Larger farms are probably more attractive to 
processors as they enable benefiting from economies of scale (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009). We control for the effects of household endowments through an asset index, 
which represents a stable measure of household welfare (Carter & Barrett, 2006). 
Farmers must have access to information about best farming practices, which they are 
likely to obtain from other farmers during local community meetings. Therefore, the 
expected relationship between consumption and attendance of community meetings is 
positive. Renting land for catfish production deters vertical coordination. As religious 
groups may be inclined to collaborate more closely (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006), we expect 
to find a positive relationship.  
 
Processors may prefer to contract or establish farms in convenient locations, so we 
consider the possibility of a location bias. Thus, we look at the prevalence of vertical 
coordination at the village level where 23 per cent of the villages have only non-
integrated farms; 26 per cent of the villages have at least one contract farm; 36 per cent of 
the villages have at least one estate farm and 15 per cent of the villages have both 
contract and estate farms. The location of farms with respect to the buyer may be decisive 
for vertical coordination as it is assumed that processors would prefer working with farms 
positioned closer to the processing facilities. To control for the influence of location, we 
use three variables: distance between the farm and the buyer, distance to the nearest 
health centre and average farmgate price at the village level. These variables enter the 
model exogenously as they primarily capture the potential exposure to information about 
different vertical coordination options. While living in a specific location may determine 
farmer’s exposure to the information about vertical coordination, it may not affect how 
much the farmer will profit from it. We expect to find a negative relationship between 
consumption and distances from buyers and health centres, which would indicate overall 
remoteness from major markets, services and sources of information. We expect to find a 
positive relationship between the average price of catfish in the village and consumption 
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as higher prices would positively translate into higher revenue and income available for 
consumption.  
 
The estimation of the impact of vertical coordination on household welfare proceeds as in 
Deb and Trivedi (2006). When  𝜌1 > 0, farms owned by processing companies (estate 
farms) have higher per capita consumption than non-integrated farms, on average, and 
when 𝜌2  > 0, contract farms have higher per capita consumption than non-integrated 
farms, again on average. Apart from enabling us to compare effects of two forms of 
vertical coordination, the joint model allows direct interpretation of selection effects 
through factor loadings 𝜆1 and 𝜆2. If 𝜆2> 0, the unobserved characteristics that induce a 
farmer to participate in contract farming are associated with a higher consumption. 
Because better-skilled farmers are expected to opt for contract farming, 𝜆2 > 0 is 
interpreted as evidence of favourable selection. Adverse selection is present if 𝜆2< 0. 
Analogous interpretations apply to 𝜆1 with respect to estate farms.  
 
In previous research, participation in contract farming has been instrumented using a 
randomly assigned hypothetical measure of farmers’ willingness to pay for participation 
in contract farming (Bellemare, 2012), membership in a farmer group (Rao & Qaim, 
2011), distance between respondent’s farm and the farm of the village leader (Miyata et 
al., 2009), transaction costs related to the purchase of inputs (Roy & Thorat, 2008) and 
measures of respondent’s trustworthiness (Warning & Key, 2002). We take a different 
route and use two instrumental variables that capture network and information effects to 
remedy endogeneity problems in the estimation.  
 
The choice of instruments is based on the observation about the strong influence of social 
collateral and information on vertical coordination outcomes (Reardon et al., 2009). By 
this, we assume that the costs of search, selection, information, procurement and 
investment decrease with the proximity and the knowledge about primary production. We 
use two village-level indicator variables as instruments, because the occurrence of 
vertical coordination in a certain area might imply lower transaction costs for processors. 
Expecting to observe a positive relationship between the history of contracts in a certain 
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village and subsequent occurrence of contracts, the first instrument is the number of years 
since the first contract in the village. In similar vein, the second instrument is the share of 
estate farms in a specific village, assuming that processors will have lower cost of 
establishing links with farmers in familiar localities. Both of our instruments help to 
partial out the bias caused by individual predispositions. Using the prevalence of different 
forms of vertical coordination in a particular area in previous years that can be considered 
exogenous with respect to individual-specific unobservable factors and household 
welfare enables us to decrease the endogeneity bias.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Determinants of Vertical Coordination 
In this section, we analyse which variables can inform on vertical coordination status of a 
farm. As Table 1 shows, the vertical coordination depends on several indicators of 
human, social and physical capital of catfish farmers. Columns (1) and (2) show results 
from the multinomial logistic regression; columns (3) and (4) show the first stage results 
from the 2SLS estimation with instrumental variables and columns (5) and (6) show the 
equivalent for the MSL model. The results of three models are fairly consistent in terms 
of the sign and significance of control variables.  
 
Column (3) in Table 1 shows a positive relationship between the aquaculture area size 
and the likelihood to be estate farmer. A positive relationship is also found for the 
multinomial logit estimation in column (1) and the MSL estimation in column (5), but the 
magnitude is not statistically significant. Estate farming is more likely for younger 
farmers with smaller households, whereby processors prefer investing in larger farms 
where they employ workers who still have not started their families. Possibly the inability 
of farmers to farm on their own – seen as the inability to secure sufficient amount of 
capital and support through a business network – leaves them with no other choice but to 
become employed by a processing company. This was corroborated in our qualitative 
interviews where several interviewees mentioned that they would gladly establish their 
own farm were it currently affordable. Just as contract farming, estate farming is more 
likely if the household head attends community meetings.  
 13 
 The probability to produce under contract increases if the household head has completed 
any form of secondary education. Experience with catfish production negatively affects 
the probability of contract farming, implying that processing companies possibly look for 
specific skills rather than experience in choosing contract farms. Contracts are more 
likely for farmers who attend community meetings and who are not religious. Farmers 
who observe higher village-level prices of catfish are more induced to contract.  
 
The instruments significantly predict the vertical coordination outcomes. The statistical 
significance of the first instrument – the share of estate farms in a specific village – is 
high for the estate farm outcome and the sign is consistent with our expectations: higher 
prevalence of estate farms in a specific village increases the likelihood of finding 
employment on estate farms. At the same time, higher incidence of estate farms decreases 
the likelihood of contract farming, shown in columns (2) and (4). The presence of estate 
farms for contract outcome is not significant in the MSL estimation in column (6). The 
second instrument – number of years since the first contract has been signed in the village 
– is statistically significant. The direction of influence is positive for both contract and 
estate farms. This finding means that the early adoption of contract farming in a specific 
village will increase the probability of contracting more farmers in the future, and it will 
also increase the probability of establishing estate farms. The F-statistic for a test of joint 
significance of the two used instruments is 21.74, precluding weak instrument concerns 
(Stock & Yogo, 2005)3.  
  
3. At 21.74, the F value is higher than critical values proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). Stock-Yogo 
weak identification test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 7.03; 15% maximal IV size 4.58; 20% 
maximal IV size 3.95 and 25% maximal IV size 3.63. 
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Table 1. Determinants of vertical coordination 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Estate  Contract   Estate  Contract   Estate  Contract  
Estimator  Multinomial logit  2SLS first stage  MSLa first stage 
Aquaculture area size 
(log) 
0.088 -0.019  0.037* -0.015  0.532 0.040 
(0.080) (0.033)  (0.021) (0.019)  (0.454) (0.233) 
Household size (log) 
 
-0.314** 0.137  -0.092** 0.066  -1.771** 0.347 
(0.137) (0.102)  (0.040) (0.057)  (0.737) (0.618) 
Age of the household 
head 
-0.010* 0.008*  -0.004** 0.004  -0.046* 0.033 
(0.005) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.028) (0.027) 
Secondary education 
 
-0.068 0.166**  -0.010 0.123**  -0.073 0.977** 
(0.148) (0.083)  (0.045) (0.049)  (0.850) (0.394) 
Share of children 15 
and under 
-0.030 0.270  -0.057 0.191  0.858 2.229 
(0.285) (0.181)  (0.110) (0.124)  (1.863) (1.368) 
Household labour 
 
0.032* -0.042  0.017** -0.015*  0.111 -0.178 
(0.019) (0.027)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.080) (0.177) 
Asset index 
 
0.057 -0.009  0.015 -0.007  0.285 0.056 
(0.103) (0.041)  (0.029) (0.024)  (0.589) (0.249) 
Experience with 
catfish 
-0.017 -0.012  -0.004 -0.011**  -0.124 -0.107** 
(0.015) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.082) (0.052) 
Community meetings 0.028 0.019  0.012* 0.012  0.236** 0.196** 
(0.023) (0.014)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.107) (0.080) 
Religious  
 
0.132 -0.171**  0.038 -0.073  0.493 -0.886** 
(0.117) (0.078)  (0.037) (0.047)  (0.766) (0.450) 
Renting land 
 
0.053 -0.152*  0.004 -0.069  -0.010 -1.054 
(0.149) (0.085)  (0.052) (0.061)  (0.979) (0.865) 
Distance to buyer (log) 
 
0.024 -0.010  0.004 -0.013  0.140 0.010 
(0.036) (0.022)  (0.011) (0.016)  (0.197) (0.134) 
Distance to nearest 
health centre (log) 
-0.059 0.045  -0.024 0.027  -0.268 0.197 
(0.047) (0.030)  (0.017) (0.020)  (0.252) (0.161) 
Average village-level 
price 
1.38e-06 8.33e-06  4.29e-07 4.94e-06  0.00002 0.00006* 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of estate farms 
in a village 
0.015*** -0.004***  0.009*** -0.002***  0.088*** 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.011) (0.010) 
Years since the first 
contract in the village 
0.001 0.038***  0.005** 0.030***  0.092* 0.270*** 
(0.009) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.006)  (0.054) (0.054) 
Constant    0.270*** -0.030  -1.037 -4.323** 
   (0.100) (0.139)  (1.544) (1.701) 
N 270 270  269 269  269 269 
Pseudo R2 0.549 0.549  0.717 0.367    
Kleibergen-Paap Wald 
F statistic 
   21.74 21.74    
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show marginal effects. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors clustered at village level are in parentheses. Estimation results are probability-
weighted.  
a MSL stands for maximum simulated likelihood treatment regression.  
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5.2. Welfare Effects of Different Vertical Coordination Forms 
Panel (a) in Table 2 shows that consumption expenditure depends on the farm type. The 
relationship is seen applying the OLS, 2SLS and treatment MSL estimation. Using 
different estimators, we show a positive impact of contract farming on household welfare. 
The OLS regression shows that securing a contract with a processing company can 
potentially increase household welfare by 27 per cent. Controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity with 2SLS and MSL estimators, we obtain about four and three times 
higher impacts, respectively. The effect of contract farming in the 2SLS regression in 
column (2) is the highest at 112 per cent, surpassing the 90 per cent gain obtained in the 
MSL estimation. In contrast, the effect of estate farming is not signiﬁcant even at the 10 
per cent level of significance in any specification.  
 
In Table 2 we observe that farm size, age of the household head, labour endowments and 
asset ownership positively affect consumption expenditure. Likewise, being able to rent 
land secures higher welfare. Average village-level prices for catfish are positively 
correlated with consumption, but the size of the coefficient is too small to bear any 
economic significance. Also, we observe a negative association between larger 
households and welfare.  
 
The lower section of Table 2 shows the MSL estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity 
bias. Selection on unobservable characteristics appears to be important for both estate and 
contract farms. The sign of the latent factor λ1 is positive and statistically different from 
zero, indicating a positive selection into estate farming based on the unobservable 
characteristics relative to that of a random farmer. The sign of the latent factor λ2 is 
negative and significant at one per cent significance level, suggesting that unobserved 
characteristics, which increase the probability of belonging to contract farming group also 
lead to lower household welfare. This may imply that contracts are appealing to 
somewhat poorer households with worse relationships with the industry. Conversely, the 
wealthier households may not need contracts as they can potentially rely on personal 
connections (unobservable) to secure sales. This explanation seems plausible as the 
importance of personal ties when choosing suppliers was emphasised in the qualitative 
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interviews with industry representatives. Underscoring this observation, a recent study 
(Belton et al., 2011) points out the importance of social and political capital in the catfish 
sector in Vietnam. Describing the labour market in MRD, Akram-Lodhi et al. (2007, p. 
168) state that ‘labour is typically hired from family and social networks, in order to ease 
transaction costs’. 
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Table 2. The effect of vertical coordination on household welfare. Dependent variable is 
per capita consumption expenditure (log). 
 (a) Full sample  (b) Reduced samplea 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS MSLb  OLS 2SLS MSLb 
Estate farm 
 
-0.003 -0.041 -0.023  0.038 0.038 0.010 
(0.189) (0.277) (0.192)  (0.218) (0.265) (0.231) 
Contract farm 
 
0.240* 0.753** 0.640***  0.255* 0.705** 0.500*** 
(0.144) (0.366) (0.176)  (0.150) (0.346) (0.166) 
Aquaculture area size 
(log) 
0.186*** 0.228*** 0.214***  0.167** 0.202*** 0.188*** 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.058)  (0.074) (0.070) (0.071) 
Household size (log) 
 
-0.490*** -0.536*** -0.512***  -0.565*** -0.613*** -0.601*** 
(0.155) (0.149) (0.146)  (0.157) (0.151) (0.155) 
Age of the household 
head 
0.016*** 0.012** 0.013***  0.019*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Secondary education 
 
0.141 0.064 0.071  0.135 0.077 0.107 
(0.138) (0.143) (0.131)  (0.161) (0.162) (0.154) 
Share of children 15 and 
under 
0.570* 0.411 0.452  0.704* 0.595* 0.651* 
(0.331) (0.305) (0.311)  (0.370) (0.360) (0.359) 
Household labour 
 
0.050* 0.055** 0.053**  0.055 0.063 0.062 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.045) (0.041) (0.043) 
Asset index 
 
0.257*** 0.250*** 0.257***  0.238*** 0.228*** 0.231*** 
(0.067) (0.063) (0.063)  (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) 
Experience with catfish 0.011 0.012 0.012  0.022 0.020 0.020 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Community meetings -0.033** -0.039** -0.037**  -0.035** -0.040** -0.037** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)  (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Religious  
 
0.143 0.153 0.140  0.108 0.116 0.107 
(0.145) (0.136) (0.137)  (0.155) (0.145) (0.148) 
Renting land 
 
0.634*** 0.727*** 0.705***  0.556*** 0.650*** 0.606*** 
(0.201) (0.195) (0.200)  (0.156) (0.169) (0.161) 
Distance to buyer (log) 
 
-0.063 -0.055 -0.052  -0.068* -0.062 -0.064 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.040)  (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Distance to nearest 
health centre (log) 
-0.037 -0.063 -0.058  0.007 -0.015 -0.007 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054)  (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) 
Average village-level 
price 
0.00002** 0.00002** 0.00002**  0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  
 
14.34*** 14.48*** 14.44***  14.08*** 14.22*** 14.19*** 
(0.387) (0.377) (0.358)  (0.461) (0.451) (0.452) 
N 269 269 269  217 217 217 
R2 0.343 0.306   0.350 0.320  
F 9.56 9.60   10.510 9.202  
λ1 (estate farms)   0.237**    0.211 
   (0.113)    (0.279) 
λ2 (contract farms)   -0.597***    -0.394*** 
   (0.140)    (0.110) 
Notes: Per capita expenditure level is calculated using OECD adult equivalence scales. Robust standard 
errors clustered at village level are in parentheses. Estimation results are probability-weighted. Significance 
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
a The reduced sample is created by restricting the number of observations only to observations in the 
common support range.  
b MSL stands for maximum simulated likelihood treatment regression.  
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There may be a concern that the identified farm categories are not comparable, violating 
the common support assumption. In other words, composition effects and heterogeneous 
characteristics of the three groups may influence some of our findings. Contract farms 
have the highest spread of expenditure (Figure 1 in the Appendix), so it may be that our 
result, which measures the mean impact, is driven by a few observations with extreme 
expenditure levels and that these farmers do not have their counterparts in other two 
groups of farmers. To avert this concern, we calculate propensity scores (PS) – a 
conditional probability of receiving the treatment (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009), based 
on the observed farmer characteristics. First, we compare non-integrated and contract 
farmers in the nearest neighbour matching estimation and then compare non-integrated 
and estate farmers using the same method. Based on the first PS estimation, we find that 
10 farmers do not have counterparts in the comparison group (96% fall in the common 
support range) and in the second estimation we find the same for 44 farmers (84% in the 
common support). Thus, based on observable characteristics, 9 non-integrated farms 
would never be classified as contract farms and 37 could never be classified as estate 
farms.  
 
In panel (b) of Table 2 we show that restricting the sample to observations within the 
common support range yields similar results about the impact of vertical coordination on 
farmers’ welfare. Compared to the full sample, the magnitude of the effect is similar in 
the OLS and 2SLS estimations (columns (4) and (5)), while the magnitude in the MSL 
estimation is 25 percentage points lower (column (6)). All estimators on the reduced 
sample show significantly positive impact of contract farming on welfare. The size of the 
effect is slightly smaller than for the whole sample, implying that contracts lead to 65 to 
102 per cent higher levels of consumption expenditure for participants. Our combined 
results, thus, point to large gains from contract farming.  
 
A significant positive impact of contract farming on consumption from our study is 
comparable to the impact of 50 per cent in Bellemare (2012), 32 per cent in Warning and 
Key (2002) and 39 per cent in Miyata et al. (2009). Our result is different from the study 
on vertical coordination in Senegal (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009), which shows that 
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both contract farming and employment on industrial farms increase household welfare. 
Although we do not find significant welfare gains for employees on estate farms, we side 
with Maertens and Swinnen (2009) in concluding that contract farms have higher welfare 
levels than both non-integrated and estate farmers.  
 
Finding no difference in welfare between employees on estate farms and non-integrated 
farmers is also an important result. Our study shows that the emergence of intensive 
export sectors is not biased against landless workers who cannot afford to establish their 
own production. Bearing in mind that the estate farm employees are not landowners, 
observing that their livelihoods are not different from non-integrated farmers could mean 
that non-integrated farmers are the most vulnerable group in the sector.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Much has changed in Vietnam during the previous decade with the emergence of 
aquaculture export sectors in which various forms of vertical coordination are replacing 
spot market transactions. The development of the catfish sector has led to important 
changes in rural parts of MRD in terms of increased employment opportunities and 
improved livelihoods. Our results show a significant welfare impact of contract farming 
after controlling for both observable and unobservable farmer characteristics, while the 
welfare impact of employment on estate farms is not significant. 
 
Even though there are indications that contract farmers capture most of the gain, our 
result implies that vertical coordination does not preclude traditionally vulnerable farmer 
groups from participating in high-value export industries through employment. Since the 
employees on estate farms are not landowners, it is important to see that their livelihoods 
are not significantly different from non-integrated farmers. This result, thus, indicates that 
non-integrated farmers are possibly the most vulnerable participants of the catfish sector.  
 
High transaction costs and information asymmetry, when coupled with a weak contract-
enforcing environment, which is prominent in developing countries, give rise to vertical 
coordination of primary production and processing, and our sample has almost identical 
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shares of contract and estate farms. However, the main type of contract employed is a 
marketing contract, which does not include transferring production or management skills 
from processors to farmers. Some effort should thus be invested in developing contract 
schemes that convey longer-term technology transfer opportunities.  
 
Given that this study shows higher consumption expenditure, on average, for contract 
farmers, it follows that rural development initiatives could focus on expanding the 
activities of processing companies in terms of higher enrolment of farmers for 
contracting. To enable this, the crucial policy activity in the sector should be directed to 
creating an environment conducive to participation of non-integrated farmers in contract 
farming. Increased numbers of contract farmers in the Vietnamese context could be 
translated into rural poverty reduction. Caution with contract farming schemes should, 
however, be exercised, as much effort needs to go into the design of contracts that are 
equitable and inclusive of smallholders who would not be selected for contracting 
without a third-party intervention.  
 
There are a few remarks about the results. First, contract farmers in this study are 
identified as having either marketing or production contracts, which could decrease the 
precision of the result and complicate the comparison of the result with other studies that 
mostly analyse outgrower contracts. Second, the dependent variable used in the 
estimation is consumption expenditure, which is not an ideal measure of farm household 
welfare (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995). Ideally, farm profits should have been used had 
the dataset allowed. Third, the cross-section nature of the data has not allowed assessing 
the welfare effects over time, so that the unobservable characteristics and endogeneity 
could be controlled for in a more efficient and consistent manner. However, we hope that 
this study can serve as a point of departure for further work, especially in comparing the 
vertical coordination outcomes in the catfish sector with other aquaculture and agriculture 
sectors.  
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Appendix  
 
 
1. Sample and Data 
Interviews were held with seven catfish farmers, both household-owned and company-
owned; 14 processing companies; five international traders experienced with catfish 
export; eight government officials comprising employees at the local offices of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and commune staff engaged in extension 
services; five input suppliers (feed and veterinary inputs); five local researchers actively 
engaged in aquaculture research both from production and technology and socio-
economic side and eight service providers including NGO representatives, consultants, 
certification auditors, legal advisors, transport providers and banks. Among the 
interviewed processing companies, the average output was 21,000 tons/year, ranging 
between 5,000 and 50,000 tons/year. Five of the interviewed companies are among the 
top 20 Vietnamese catfish exporters.  
 
Qualitative interviews took a semi-structured form with open-ended questions, lasting 30 
to 90 minutes. On some occasion, informal interview format or electronic email exchange 
were used to collect data, as this was more suitable for the respondents. The interviewees 
were asked to provide information about a broader regulatory and institutional 
environment of catfish production, processing and trade. Financial and resource flows 
were also investigated, as well as the ownership structure of farms and processing 
companies. The interviews also addressed the motivation of processing companies to 
contract farmers or to integrate primary production. For interviewees who were able to 
speak English, the interviews were conducted in English or with the help of an interpreter 
for Vietnamese in case of non-English speakers. Data obtained through qualitative 
interviews was verified against published sources whenever possible. 
 
2. Theoretical Background – Details   
In our setting, we follow the outcome of a processing company’s decision about whether 
to ‘make or buy’, meaning whether to integrate backwards into primary production or to 
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contract4, which is to outsource primary production. Subsequently we assess the impact 
of these two vertical coordination options on farmers’ welfare. The decision about 
vertical coordination is made in light of the costs related to these two institutional 
arrangements: the higher the costs related to contracting primary production, the greater 
is the incentive for a processor to internalise production. We believe that a processing 
company’s preferred choice in the catfish sector is to organise own primary production. 
This assertion is based on information from several in-depth interviews with processing 
companies5. Also, only 17 per cent of farmers under contract stated that they receive 
inputs from the company. This low prevalence of the outgrower contract type tells that if 
companies want to get engaged in primary production, they would prefer to do it on their 
own, rather than to support farmers’ production. This decision is to a large extent 
supported by high production risks, such as the occurrence of fish diseases, lower quality, 
limited application of food standards and consequently, unreliable supply. Being less risk 
averse, processing companies are reluctant to incur costs of avoiding uncertainty.  
 
As an alternative to owning primary production, a processing company can choose to 
enter into contractual relationship with selected farmers after which it sets the contract 
conditions. Being more flexible under market uncertainty, contracts enable the processing 
companies to entirely transfer production risks to farmers (Grosh, 1994; Singh, 2002). 
The choice for or against contracting is made in the light of information about the 
profitability: contracts are offered to the farmers whose profitability seems highest. 
Further on, the company needs to identify which farmers are likely to be the most 
profitable suppliers, given the level of uncertainty surrounding farmers’ preferences or 
ability to adhere to the contract (Barrett et al., 2012). 
 
4 Our sample shows that a dominant form of contracts signed between processors and farmers are marketing contracts whose specifications refer only to the sale conditions. This is possibly due to the weak contract-enforcing environment, which precludes longer-term commitments. As one contract type highly dominates the other, analysing the differential effects of two contract types is not possible in this study.  5 Several processing companies stated that they are planning to increase sourcing from own production to 100% in the next two to five years. The probable reason for the primary production not being fully integrated at present is that the processors are credit rationed. This is contrary to previous findings (Singh 2002), which – based on the gains from risk reduction for processors – argue for the benefits of contract over fully integrated farming.  
 28 
                                                        
By contracting, a processing company aims to secure a desired quantity of unprocessed 
fish while minimising production costs and transaction costs. While there are several 
kinds of fixed transaction costs, such as screening, monitoring and extension activities, 
there are also transaction costs that are proportional to the size of production, such as 
transport to the processing facilities. It is the proportional transaction costs that drive 
processors to contract with larger farmers; as most of these costs are incurred on a per-
farmer basis, a processor will minimise the transaction costs it faces by contracting with 
as few farmers as possible. Also, under a binding limited liability constraint, companies 
would prefer to contract with wealthier farmers.  
 
A farmer will accept a company’s contract offer if his perception about the expected 
welfare from contracting is at least as high as that of not contracting. Contracts can be 
appealing to farmers as they can offer insurance against market and production risks, 
provide access to credit, necessary inputs and information about the uncertainties related 
to production and marketing of high-value commodities (Barrett et al., 2012). We extend 
the rationale to the selection of estate farming for livelihood. Risk aversion is positively 
correlated with contract farming (Key & Runsten, 1999) and negatively correlated with 
income (Binswanger, 1980). It follows that wealthier farmers, who show less risk 
aversion, would favour contracts. If, on the other hand, the contract entails credit 
provision, then small, risk-averse farmers would also prefer to sign a contract with a 
processing company. Likewise, due to lower shadow price for household labour, a 
contract could be appealing for a smallholder who can use household labour in 
production. Yet, if there were other risk-reducing options in the form of non-farm earning 
opportunities, in spite of their risk aversion, some farmers would decide against contract 
farming. Assuming that the wage employment is less risky than contract farming, highly 
risk-averse credit-constrained farmers are expected to choose employment with 
processing companies.  
 
The implications of the theory are that the spread of gains from farming differ by vertical 
coordination choice. The benefits of any specific coordination alternative for participants 
depend on the contract terms and participants’ characteristics. The gains from vertical 
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coordination are assumed to be greater for estate and contract farmers than for non-
integrated farms. Furthermore, the decision about estate or contract farming has 
consequences for the whole sector and broader rural environment. If processing 
companies choose to work closely with wealthier farmers, poorer producers will fail to 
benefit directly from different vertical coordination alternatives. Thus, vertical 
coordination has the potential to affect the way wealth is distributed within the sector, 
and can impair existing economic patterns (Key and Runsten, 1999). 
 
3. Descriptive Analysis 
3.1. Farm Characteristics 
Table A1 shows that processing companies tend to organise production on larger farms 
and to hire more full-time workers as this reduces operational costs. Estate farms are on 
average twice as large as contract or non-integrated farms that set just under 2ha of 
production surface for catfish farming. Processing companies tend to own land on which 
they produce catfish; land is rented on only around 35 per cent of estate farms. To start 
the primary production, processing companies can acquire land use rights from existing 
farmers or purchase and convert new land6. After the land is acquired, processors hire 
production managers or technicians to manage catfish production according to their 
precise specifications. Rarely are traditional farmers employed with the intent to manage 
production for a processing company 7 . This reflects the need of the sector for a 
workforce endowed with specialised skills or a preference for quickly learning new skills. 
Table A1 shows that estate farmers have fewer years of experience with catfish farming 
than contract or independent farmers, but they have higher rate of secondary school 
completion. The motives for becoming an estate farm employee are primarily monetary, 
but some have arrived at this position through a combination of factors such as tradition, 
occupational preference or recommendations from friends or relatives. For 51 per cent of 
the employees, working on an estate farm is a way of earning higher income, for 22 per 
cent of them it is the preferred occupation, for 13 per cent of them it is related to their 
6 In Vietnam, land is owned by the state, but land titles can be legally transferred, mortgaged or inherited 
(Ravallion & van de Walle, 2008). 
7 In this case, a farm is sold to a processing company and that the farmer becomes an employee. 
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previous work experience and for eight per cent, it is an occupation related to their field 
of studies. Albeit a part of ‘a rapidly emerging class of landless wage labour’ (Akram-
Lodhi, 2004, p. 757), the higher education level of estate farm employees enables them to 
find employment on estate farms and potentially raise their living standards and wealth. 
Work force on estate farms is the youngest, comprising farmers who come from smaller 
households with fewer children.  
 
The employees on the estate farms form a part of the landless labour force that has either 
‘lost their land either due to government repossession or a household economic situation’ 
(Akram-Lodhi, Borras, & Kay, 2007, p. 182) or that works on estate farms until 
establishing their own farms. Estate farms receive all the inputs and equipment required 
for production from the processing company. The average village-level price for catfish 
is the highest for estate farms and the lowest in case of non-integrated farmers. In terms 
of distance to the nearest health centre, estate farms have an advantage over both non-
integrated and contract farms.  
 
Contract farmers have on average less household members engaged in catfish farming, 
but they participate by 40 per cent more often in community meetings than other farm 
categories. Secondary education is more common among contract farmers than among 
non-integrated farmers. Contract farmers are least likely to rent land for catfish 
production and they have on average four years of experience with catfish more than 
estate farm employees. 
 
Key motives for entering into contract farming appears to be price stability, as 46 per cent 
of contract farmers identified stable price as one of the reasons for contracting. Only 18 
per cent stated that they expect to obtain higher price through contract. Secondary 
motives include credit access and more insurance, which were relevant for 36 per cent 
and 31 per cent of the contract farmers, respectively. Taken together, these reasons for 
contracting illustrate high instability and competitiveness in the catfish sector. They also 
illustrate that processors are powerful actors in the sector as they are able to dictate the 
terms in the market.   
 31 
 The contract arrangements are not exempt from hold-up problems, which arise when the 
return from the alternative trading arrangement for the farmer is lower than the return 
from contract. In the catfish sector, processing companies could use quality inspections 
performed before the purchase, to exacerbate these problems. The quality testing includes 
analysis of the presence of banned antibiotic residues, inspection of ﬂesh colour and 
measurement of ﬁsh size. Processing companies have been reported to delay the delivery 
of quality inspection results while waiting for farmgate prices to decrease in the periods 
of lower demand. In this way, farmers bear huge costs of prolonged feeding, whereas 
processing companies can coerce them into accepting low prices or unfavourable terms 
such as staggered or delayed payments (Belton, Little, & Sinh, 2011). Even though they 
were put in place to preclude information asymmetry problems, quality inspections could 
be used to unfairly increase profits for processing companies.  
 
In periods of high demand, processing companies are at risk of default by farmers. 
Contract clauses are in principle designed to prevent farmers from ‘side-selling’ when the 
market price surpasses the contract price, but the experience has shown that farmers can 
default without serious consequences by selling output to other processors or middlemen 
who offer higher prices.  
 
Spot market transactions are still present in the catfish sector, as the high number of non-
integrated farmers in our sample illustrates. In our sample, 75 per cent of farms sell 
directly to processing companies while the remaining 25 per cent sell to middlemen. The 
main reason for selling through the middlemen is better accessibility, while the main 
motives for selling directly to a processing company are guaranteed sales and guaranteed 
price, followed by access to technical assistance, inputs and credit. The existence of spot 
market tells that it is possible to participate in a modern export sector without formal 
arrangements with processing companies. It is possible that this category of farmers is not 
experiencing adverse effects of the processors’ selection process, but that producing 
independently could have some advantages. Indeed, 61 per cent of these farmers think 
they are doing better without the contract. 
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With an average of 10 years of farming catfish, non-integrated farmers are the most 
experienced. Their farms are, however, located furthest away from the buyers’ facilities 
compared to both estate and contract farms. Non-integrated farmers are more frequently 
religious than contract and estate farmers.  
 
Table A1. Differences in farm characteristics for different vertical coordination options 
Variables  Unit  Whole 
sample 
Non-integrated 
farmers 
Estate 
farmers  
Contract 
farmers 
Aquaculture area size in 
2010  
Hectare  2.63 
(4.95) 
1.79 
(3.67) 
4.51*** 
(5.88) 
1.81 
(4.86) 
Household size Persons  3.74 
(1.59) 
3.98 
(1.38) 
3.14*** 
(1.56) 
4.04 
(1.70) 
Age of the household 
head 
Years  42.38 
(12.49) 
45.08 
(12.87) 
36.44*** 
(11.23) 
44.92 
(11.29) 
Having secondary 
education (1/0) 
Per cent 35.14 
(47.83) 
22.33 
(41.85) 
43.52*** 
(49.87) 
42.05*** 
(49.65) 
Share of children 15 and 
under 
Per cent 0.35 
(0.46) 
18.61 
(0.21) 
11.26*** 
(0.18) 
20.73 
(0.22) 
Household labour  Persons 2.11 
(1.96) 
2.32 
(1.35) 
2.04 
(3.03) 
1.93** 
(1.01) 
Asset index Index 0.01 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(1.07) 
-0.14 
(1.13) 
0.08 
(0.73) 
Experience with catfish Years  8.31 
(6.59) 
10.61 
(8.03) 
4.87*** 
(3.14) 
8.98* 
(5.82) 
Participation in 
community meetings  
Frequency   2.64 
(3.32) 
2.29 
(2.81) 
2.38 
(3.93) 
3.29** 
(3.15) 
Religious (1/0) Per cent 66.67 
(47.23) 
77.67 
(41.85) 
56.47*** 
(49.87) 
63.63** 
(48.38) 
Renting land (1/0) Per cent 19.20 
(39.46) 
14.56 
(35.45) 
36.47*** 
(48.42) 
7.95* 
(27.21) 
Distance to buyer  Kilometres 24.58 
(32.06) 
31.66 
(38.87) 
19.50*** 
(22.87) 
21.21** 
(29.61) 
Distance to nearest health 
centre 
Kilometres 16.23 
(38.72) 
19.53 
(44.58) 
10.81* 
(29.29) 
17.59 
(39.21) 
Average village-level 
price 
VND/kg 12,404 
(7,946) 
10,696 
(7,874) 
13,951*** 
(7,229) 
12,909** 
(8,390) 
Monthly household 
expenditure 
VND 
million 
17.73 
(51.25) 
13.38 
(1.73) 
15.92 
(2.99) 
24.65* 
(9.09) 
Monthly per capita 
expenditure  
VND 
million 
6.46 
(14.31) 
4.79 
(0.63) 
7.52** 
(1.31) 
7.42 
(2.29) 
Number  276 103 85 88 
Notes: Non-integrated farms are the farms that sell on the spot market, estate farms are processor-owned 
farms that are operated by hired labour and contract farmers are households producing catfish on contract 
with the processing companies. There is no overlap between categories: one household can belong to only 
one category. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard deviation is in parentheses. 
Expenditure values are expressed in Vietnamese Dong (VND) million. 1 USD ≈ 20,500 VND. Per capita 
expenditure level is calculated using OECD adult equivalence scales.  
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 The observed farm categories do not defer significantly in terms of the asset index that 
comprises both production and household assets. This could imply that the rate of success 
of catfish farmers is potentially determined by the capability to better manage variable 
costs that arise in production. 
 
3.2. Poverty and Welfare 
Table A1 shows that non-integrated farms have the lowest expenditure level, but the 
difference in per capita expenditure is significantly lower only when compared to estate 
farms. From the cumulative distribution of consumption expenditure shown in Figure 1, 
we see that the expenditure level is similar across the observed farm categories. Even 
though contract and estate farms have 65 per cent higher expenditure levels than non-
integrated farms when evaluated at the mean, high unconditional distributional 
differences are not observable. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not show evidence of 
statistically significant differences between expenditure distributions for the three 
observed farm categories  (test value 0.148 with p=0.208 for a comparison of non-
integrated and estate farms and 0.149 with p=0.197 for a comparison of non-integrated 
and contract farms). The conditional differences are, however, possible. For example, the 
difference between expenditure distributions becomes more apparent after comparing 
only younger farmers (Figure 1).  
 
Poverty is not common among the surveyed farms. The share of households below 
poverty line was calculated using the 1.25 USD and 2 USD/day poverty lines for extreme 
and moderate poverty. These poverty lines were converted to local currency equivalents 
using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. The PPP exchange rate of 1 USD to 
4,713 VND in 2005 (IBRD, 2008) was updated to 2010 rates using the consumer price 
index (GSO, 2012). In the sample, nine per cent of households have consumption level 
lower than the 1.25 USD/day poverty line and 22 per cent of households have per capita 
consumption lower than 2 USD/day poverty line. Figure 2 shows that the share of 
extremely and moderately poor households is highest among non-integrated catfish 
farms. Estate farms and contract farms have almost identical share of poor households. 
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However, in terms of the Vietnamese national poverty line for rural areas, which amounts 
to 360,000 VND per person per month (GSO, 2011), only 3 households from the sample 
can be classified as poor.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of per capita consumption expenditure by farm type 
Notes: Panel (a) shows the cumulative distribution of per capita consumption expenditure for all farms and 
Panel (b) shows the distribution for farmers younger than 38. 
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Figure 2. Share of poor households in different farm categories 
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